Exclusive: Ottawa Warned On PRC Blueprint Targeting MPs and Senators Decade Before NSICOP '24 Revelations
'There is now a ‘new strategy’ to invite as many city, provincial, and federal politicians as possible in the run-up to various elections' CSIS reports in 2014.
OTTAWA, Canada — A leaked 2014 intelligence document from Canadian Security Intelligence Service warned that China was orchestrating a broad strategy to cultivate Canadian politicians at every level ahead of various elections, relying on community leaders as intermediaries. The classified CSIS report—marked “SECRET/CanadianEyesOnly”—details how Chinese Embassy officials in Ottawa tasked diaspora figures to target specific Canadian politicians, including a sitting Senator and a Member of Parliament, inviting them to a high-profile Chinese New Year banquet in 2015.
Canadian security officials have long voiced concern over foreign interference, but this document makes clear that shortly after President Xi Jinping rose to power, Beijing began laying the groundwork from its Embassy near Parliament Hill to scale its influence in Canada. Tactics included mass invitations to elected officials and calculated pressure campaigns. But unlike other leaked intelligence reviewed by The Bureau, which focused on Chinese election interference in Vancouver and Toronto, this document centers on Ottawa—Canada’s seat of federal power and home to its elite bureaucrats.
“There is now a ‘new strategy’ to invite as many city, provincial, and federal politicians as possible in the run-up to various elections, to ‘make a lot of noise’ and submit demands to those politicians in exchange for community support,” the document warns. CSIS noted “no further information on the event to which the politicians would be invited.”
Although Canadian authorities received these warnings nearly a decade ago, the issue resurfaced prominently with the 2024 National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) report. NSICOP, established in 2017, reviews sensitive intelligence and security matters and compiles periodic reports for the Prime Minister. In its 2024 review, NSICOP concludes that some Canadian MPs have been “semi-witting or witting” participants in foreign interference efforts.
Moving from the 2014 CSIS alert to the present, government documents from that earlier period already flagged how Chinese officials were using community events and diplomatic receptions to cultivate relationships with Canadian political figures. CSIS circulated the bulletin to senior government agencies—Global Affairs Canada, the Privy Council Office, and the Communications Security Establishment—warning that PRC diplomats were guiding community representatives to arrange direct channels of influence over politicians.
By 2015, before the federal election, CSIS believed Beijing’s campaign was broadening to include municipal and provincial politicians. The goal, according to the intelligence, was pressuring officials with community demands in return for electoral support. Fast-forward a decade, and the 2024 NSICOP report indicates that such efforts may have borne fruit for foreign states. NSICOP mentions how foreign governments—predominantly China—have tried to sway or co-opt certain Canadian lawmakers in exchange for election support.
At the same time, the newly concluded Hogue Commission (established under separate terms of reference to examine foreign interference controversies) has questioned some of NSICOP’s more alarming findings. In its final report, the Hogue Commission downplayed evidence of illicit dealings between Canadian parliamentarians and foreign states, claiming it found “no substantive proof” that any Canadian official crossed a legal line. The sharp discrepancy between NSICOP’s warnings and Hogue’s conclusions underscores the complexity of assessing intelligence reporting alongside legal standards. Meanwhile, some Canadian experts argue the nation lacks both the legislative framework and the investigative resources to prosecute foreign interference cases that might implicate political leaders. Unlike the United States, for instance, Canada does not have a powerful Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)-type statute, making prosecution of foreign interference far more challenging.
As an example, Linda Sun, an elite staffer for two Democratic governors in New York, was recently charged in a sprawling foreign-agent case that includes allegations she systematically blocked engagement between the governors and Taiwanese officials, and influenced policy stances to favor China. According to a high-level intelligence source who spoke with The Bureau, the same method was used by a staff member of a Trudeau government cabinet minister, yet no enforcement action is known to have occurred. In a recent private briefing on the Linda Sun investigation and on China’s extensive espionage and interference operations in the United States, former CIA analyst Nicholas Eftimiades confirmed to The Bureau that he is aware of similar tactics employed to block engagement with Taiwanese officials in Canada and other countries, including Sweden, France and Belgium.
Looking deeper into the 2024 NSICOP material, a striking parallel emerges with the decade-old CSIS file. In paragraph 164, NSICOP explicitly states it has “seen troubling intelligence that some Parliamentarians are, in the words of the intelligence services, ‘semi-witting or witting’ participants in the efforts of foreign states to interfere in our politics.” According to the report, such participation can include frequent communication with foreign missions before or during political campaigns to secure support from community groups or businesses, knowingly accepting funds or benefits, granting foreign diplomats privileged information on Parliament, and attempting to influence fellow MPs on behalf of a foreign government.
It follows logically that these alarming developments mirror the Chinese influence plans described in CSIS’s 2014 warnings about the PRC’s organized efforts. The continuity suggests that Beijing’s operations in Canada are not only methodical but also persistent—and likely successful.
The 2014 report specifically references the upcoming visit of Li Jianguo, then Vice Chair of the National People’s Congress (NPC), describing how PRC Embassy officials instructed community representatives to mobilize a significant turnout for his event in Ottawa.