Exclusive: Beijing Endorsed Nomination of 41 Candidates in Canada’s 2019 Election

Justin Trudeau's Markham Outreach Days Before 2019 Vote ‘Important’ for Securing Key Chinese Votes, CCP Report Says

An elite Chinese Communist Party organ has published a chillingly sophisticated analysis of People’s Republic interference during Canada’s 2019 federal election, noting that Justin Trudeau personally campaigned in key Toronto-area ridings and highlighting Beijing’s satisfaction that 41 ‘distinguished’ Chinese candidates were nominated by various political parties in 2019, achieving a reported election ‘success rate of 20 percent.’

The analysis was published in February 2021 by the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC), which experts describe as a central agency in the CCP’s United Front system, functioning as a “bridge” to connect the CCP with Chinese populations abroad. Alex Joske, an expert cited in Canadian immigration proceedings, explains that ACFROC’s primary objective is to mobilize diaspora networks in support of Beijing’s policies, particularly during national exigencies. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, Joske reports that ACFROC coordinated with Chinese communities worldwide to source and direct medical supplies back to China, demonstrating its capacity to mobilize global diaspora communities.

In its February 2021 report, analyzed exclusively by The Bureau, ACFROC highlights the significance of the Liberal Party leader’s engagement with Chinese voters, noting:

“Trudeau Jr. personally went to seek votes at a Chinese supermarket in Markham, an area of Toronto where Chinese people live, demonstrating that Chinese votes play an important role in the general election.”

ACFROC's report also details the “important role of WeChat” in mobilizing voters and reflects the assessment that 41 candidates of special interest to Beijing were nominated by various parties in the fall 2019 contest—a significant improvement over “only 27 and 23 in 2015 and 2011.”

Charles Burton, a respected sinologist and Mandarin-language analyst, reviewed the ACFROC report for The Bureau. “The document identifies 41 ‘distinguished’ Chinese candidates nominated in 2019, so I judge that the use of ‘distinguished’ implies identification of candidates potentially useful to the United Front’s aims,” Burton said.

Notably, ACFROC’s document corroborates what leaked Canadian intelligence reviewed by The Bureau has alleged regarding the use of social media apps, specifically WeChat, to circulate party narratives and mobilize voters. However, the report goes beyond celebrating recent successes, critiquing the need for Chinese Canadian community organizations to employ more systematic and long-term approaches to enhance their electoral influence. This strategic analysis highlights CCP gains while signaling a deep and sustained commitment to shaping Canadian democracy through coordinated diaspora networks.

The document points directly to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s targeted outreach in Greater Toronto, including his high-profile appearance in Markham just before the election. This area has been central to recent allegations of election interference, involving 11 candidates allegedly supported by Beijing in the 2019 contest. Trudeau’s appointment of Markham-area MP Mary Ng as the only Chinese Canadian in his cabinet is also prominently noted. Both Trudeau and Ng have rejected any suggestion that the Liberal Party has been entangled in Beijing’s electoral interference.

“This article clearly aims to guide the agents of the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department in their strategic work to gain leverage for China by placing persons of Chinese origin into the Parliament of Canada,” Burton told The Bureau.

He noted that the document acknowledges a 20 percent success rate among ethnic Chinese candidates in 2019, with 8 out of 41 candidates winning seats, and commends 13 key community associations, including the Canada Committee 100 Society (CCS100), for this achievement.

Summarizing further, Burton pointed out that in the section titled “Inadequacies and Recommendations,” the report critiques local Chinese community organizations for inadequate “management” and a lack of unity, which it suggests has led to resistance against directives from “overseas Chinese leaders.” According to Burton, “The implication is that Canada’s United Front work to co-opt leaders of organizations for Canadians of ethnic Chinese origin needs to be further strengthened.” He added, “The article proposes that electing ethnic Chinese can help strengthen ties between Canada and China, but this is a perversion of Canadian democracy. Canadian Members of Parliament should represent the interests of their constituents, not the interests of a foreign power.”

The ACFROC report also critiques current mobilization strategies, urging community groups to move beyond “last-minute” campaign tactics like fundraising dinners and candidate forums. It advocates for a shift toward sustained voter education and the strategic cultivation of political talent within the diaspora.

It is also significant that ACFROC, a key CCP United Front agency, identifies WeChat as a vital tool for political mobilization among Chinese Canadians. The report’s mention of WeChat aligns with deep concerns from an October 2022 CSIS intelligence assessment previously reported by The Bureau. A translation of the ACFROC document says, “Social media, especially WeChat, plays an important role in mobilizing Chinese voters. Chinese people discussing political topics on WeChat can greatly enhance their awareness of participating in politics. Before and on the election day, almost all Chinese people’s WeChat Moments were flooded with information about voting.”

The CSIS document reviewed exclusively by The Bureau reveals similar information from the opposite perspective, detailing systematic interference by Beijing in Canada’s elections and covert support for specific candidates, identifying WeChat as a crucial platform for influencing political outcomes. According to CSIS, “WeChat is a Chinese-language social media platform that is widely used by the broader diaspora to maintain links back to family in China and to consume Chinese-language media and news. However, the platform is subject to the CCP’s cyber regulations and is heavily censored. During GE44 [Canada’s 2021 election], disinformation activities targeting the Conservative Party of Canada and a CPC candidate were [conducted on WeChat.]”

Among the 13 community organizations credited for supporting this effort is CCS100, or the Canada Committee 100 Society, which is depicted as instrumental in mobilizing voters, engaging in fundraising, and supporting candidate campaigns despite challenges posed by tensions between Canada and China during the Meng Wanzhou case.

As The Bureau reported last week, in December 2021, then-Attorney General David Eby approved a $20,000 grant to CCS100, ostensibly for anti-racism and community engagement. However, CCS100 and its leader—a prominent journalist—have come under scrutiny for their documented ties to the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and connections to political donors involved in Eby’s 2022 NDP leadership campaign. CCS100’s media partners, Rise Weekly and Lahoo.ca, both endorsed Eby’s leadership bid and played prominent roles in the 2021 federal election, promoting candidates aligned with CCS100’s objectives.

Archived records provide a direct link between CCS100 and PRC political objectives. CCS100’s advisory board includes a professor who served as an “Overseas Chinese Representative by Special Invitation” to the 11th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a core entity within the United Front. Tasked with fostering allegiance to the PRC among overseas Chinese communities, the CPPCC is integral to Beijing’s broader influence operations and seeks to embed CCP narratives across international diaspora networks.