California to Beijing: The Hidden Path Linking 2 PLA Vets, a U.S. Star Candidate, and China’s President Xi

The Bureau’s analysis reveals a consistent playbook deployed from New York and Boston to California and Canadian networks

CHINO HILLS, Calif. — Federal prosecutors have charged Yaoning “Mike” Sun, 64, of Chino Hills—a former People’s Liberation Army officer—with acting as an unregistered agent of the People’s Republic of China, the latest in a string of indictments exposing Beijing’s systematic efforts to influence American political institutions. Unsealed this week, the California case provides an unusually detailed glimpse into Beijing’s clandestine schemes: deploying Chinese military intelligence assets to strategically groom a rising municipal candidate and muzzle pro-Taiwan voices in state and local arenas.

This extraordinary prosecution, however, directly links Chinese military veterans to that unidentified “New Political Star” in California politics—an individual who, prosecutors say, ran a media company with Sun and even traveled with him to China, allegedly meeting elite Chinese Communist officials.

Sun’s arrest, the latest in a series of such cases, emerges from sweeping F.B.I. investigations that have traced subtle but systematic patterns of interference from coast to coast. The Bureau’s comparative analysis of three recent indictments—in California, New York, and Boston—highlights a precision-engineered playbook: creating “core teams” to steer policy discussions, orchestrating counter-protests to marginalize pro-Taiwan and pro-Hong Kong advocacy, and arranging delegations to China for face-to-face meetings with United Front Work Department officials.

This broad campaign against democracy, The Bureau’s research shows, does not stop at the U.S. border. While federal charges have been filed against purported Chinese agents in the United States—and Australia has enacted tougher laws against foreign interference—Canada has lagged behind in implementing similar measures. Investigative findings point to parallel influence networks extending deep into Canada’s political spheres, where intelligence agencies have flagged concerns.

The California case centers on the criminal complaint against Sun, who prosecutors say served as campaign manager for an unnamed city council candidate, identified only as “Individual 1.” After that candidate’s successful election in 2022, Sun allegedly reported the victory to Chinese officials—via Chen Jun, a previously convicted P.R.C. agent—and sought $80,000 to intensify efforts against “anti-China forces,” including Taiwanese independence advocates.

Prosecutors detail Sun’s establishment of a “core team” under the U.S.-China Friendship Promotional Association, a seemingly benign front group that they say operated on Beijing’s behalf. Although the elected official did not attend pivotal meetings, Sun and Chen portrayed the politician as a reliable partner aligned with the Chinese Communist Party’s strategic objectives.

According to the F.B.I. affidavit, Sun and Chen were working under an official called the “big boss”—believed to be a senior Chinese Communist leader.

And both were military veterans.

“SUN has previously served in China’s army, the People’s Liberation Army,” the affidavit says. “The F.B.I. has obtained photos showing both SUN and CHEN in PLA military uniform.”

Also, Sun’s publicly available LinkedIn profile lists him as Director of “U.S. News Center,” a purported media outlet he ran with Individual 1, while “F.B.I. records show Sun paid for some of Individual 1’s travel expenses,” court filings allege.

Demonstrating even closer ties, the unidentified candidate, believed to be female according to Chinese-language reports, was linked to Sun in property records.

“SUN’s last-registered physical address with the DMV is a home owned by Individual 1,” the affidavit states.

From the United States to Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, top figures from similar “friendship associations” have been observed attending United Front meetings in China—sometimes even meeting President Xi Jinping. The F.B.I. affidavit notes: “CHEN appears to have met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and also attended high-level CCP functions, including the 70th Anniversary of the CCP in Beijing in 2019. Photos corroborate my belief that CHEN had high-level access in Beijing.”

In August 2023, investigators say Mr. Sun and the council member traveled to China and met with P.R.C. officials—a visit prosecutors present as clear evidence of a direct conduit between Beijing’s overseas operatives and local American politics.

Underlining the gravity of this travel, United States Attorney Martin Estrada said yesterday: “The conduct alleged in this complaint is deeply concerning. We cannot permit hostile foreign powers to meddle in the governance of our country. My office and our law enforcement partners will continue to prioritize the security of our nation and the preservation of the liberties that make this country the envy of the world.”

The California indictment mirrors revelations in New York, where Linda Sun (no relation to Yaoning Sun), a former aide to Governors Kathy Hochul and Andrew Cuomo, was accused of using her official position to block contact between state leaders and Taiwanese officials, while easing Chinese access to sensitive information. Linda Sun allegedly held a secret U.F.W.D. post, leveraging her role as a “chief diversity officer” to advance P.R.C. agendas and undermine pro-Taiwan activities.

In Boston, federal prosecutors charged Litang Liang with organizing counter-protests and founding the New England Alliance for a Peaceful Reunification of China, reportedly at the direction of Chinese consular officials and the Taiwan Affairs Office. Liang’s group not only targeted pro-democracy activists—such as Frances Hui, a student leader under a HK$1-million bounty by Hong Kong authorities—but also funneled intelligence back to Beijing. He is accused of traveling to China in 2018 to confer with United Front and Taiwan Affairs Office officials and laying the groundwork for persistent monitoring of pro-democracy figures.

Taken together, the three cases form a mosaic of Beijing’s modus operandi. They detail covertly built networks, funded and guided by the C.C.P., relying on community infiltration, political grooming, and active measures to silence dissent. All three indictments describe operatives traveling to China for direction, establishing core teams of loyal associates, and waging influence campaigns to muzzle Taiwanese independence sentiment.

In the California matter, for instance, investigators cite a 2022 post-election luncheon at a Rowland Heights restaurant—a “core member lunch,” according to the affidavit—where Chen Jun purportedly briefed a P.R.C. official on their successful efforts. By early 2023, Chen was instructing Sun to draft a fresh report for Chinese officials on their cultivation of “Individual 1,” whom Sun boasted of having helped elect. Subsequent communications show Chen urging Sun to depict the council member as a “New Political Star” connected to other prominent politicians.

The Jamestown Foundation’s 2019 report on the Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China (C.P.P.R.C.) offers a prescient framework for understanding these events. Documenting the proliferation of C.P.P.R.C. chapters across at least 91 countries—including U.S. cities like Los Angeles, Boston, and New York—the report identifies these chapters as nerve centers of Beijing’s global influence network. The C.C.P., it warns, employs such fronts in a long-term strategy to “undermine democratic norms and open debate—not only within China itself, but internationally.”

The report calls for stronger defenses by democratic societies, urging stricter campaign finance laws, more robust enforcement of foreign agent registration requirements, and vigilant investigative journalism to expose and counter covert lobbying. While the U.S. Justice Department’s indictments underscore the seriousness of foreign interference, The Bureau’s research suggests other democracies, notably Canada, have yet to mount an equally forceful response. Though Canadian and American intelligence agencies have reportedly examined overlapping networks of alleged influence operations—ranging from electoral interference to high-tech espionage involving Tesla—no Canadian prosecutions have followed to date.

Australia, by contrast, has enacted more stringent foreign interference laws, setting a possible blueprint for others.

As the California case unfolds, its implications transcend a single city council seat. The line from a small-town campaign in Southern California to the closed-door sessions of the U.F.W.D. in Beijing grows clearer. The question now, as a hawkish U.S. President-elect prepares to take office, is whether other nations—Canada chief among them—will collaborate with U.S. agencies to contain and dismantle United Front networks that transcend borders.