Beijing’s 2021 Election Report Highlights Sikh Leaders’ Voter Pressure on Trudeau, Sets Blueprint for Chinese Diaspora Influence

OTTAWA, Canada — A sensitive analysis from a key arm of the People’s Republic of China’s overseas influence operations, published just weeks after Canada’s 2021 federal election, reveals Beijing’s strategic interest in the comparative success of Chinese and Indian immigrant communities in Canada’s 2019 and 2021 votes, particularly the extraordinary influence wielded by Sikh leaders, who reportedly pressured Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government to amend an extremist threat report linked to the 1985 Air India bombing by warning that failure to comply would cost the Liberal Party financial backing and access to Sikh voters.

The analysis, posted to the WeChat account of the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC)—a group identified by experts as a primary influence arm of the United Front Work Department—reflects Beijing’s long-standing strategy of leveraging overseas Chinese diasporas to advance its geopolitical objectives. The ACFROC report examines the comparative effectiveness of diaspora-driven political mobilization, framing the successes of the Sikh community as a model for Beijing’s agents to emulate while offering strategies to overcome hurdles hindering Chinese Canadian political influence.

Exclusive analysis of this October 2021 Chinese document illuminates previous reporting from The Bureau, which uncovered evidence of PRC proxies financially infiltrating Canada’s political system. Leaked Canadian intelligence suggested that PRC-linked actors targeted the federal Conservative Party’s 2022 leadership contest, following leader Erin O’Toole’s criticism of Beijing.

The October 2022 Intelligence Assessment referenced by The Bureau detailed how a “PRC-linked proxy” attempted to “help elect the next leader of a federal political party in Canada.” According to the document, this unidentified agent “and their associates” actively signed up party members and paid their membership fees to support a particular leadership candidate. The same document—cited exclusively by The Bureau a year ago—also revealed that in 2022, an Indian Consulate in Canada informed an unidentified leadership candidate for the same party that they “cannot attend any Indian community events or events hosted by the [Consulate].”

The Bureau also reported on a separate February 2021 ACFROC analysis celebrating Beijing’s endorsement of 41 candidates in Canada’s 2019 federal election.

The October 2021 ACFROC report is entirely different in its granular dissection of tensions between Hindu and Sikh populations in India and how this has impacted Canadian electoral politics. The report explicitly acknowledges the historical stigma associated with Canadian Sikhs following the 1985 Air India bombing. While Canadian public safety officials remain concerned about extremism linked to some Sikh leaders in Vancouver and Toronto, they recognize that the majority of the community opposes radicalism. However, Beijing’s study portrays the Sikh leaders’ ability to mobilize fundraising and votes from over 170 temples in Canada as a blueprint for achieving influence in federal elections.

“Religious leaders play a central role in this structure, advocating clear and consistent policy goals on behalf of their communities,” reads a translated section of the report. “This ability to mobilize effectively highlights the contrast between the organizational strength of the Indian community and the challenges faced by the Chinese community in Canadian politics.”

It cites controversy surrounding Canada’s 2018 Public Report on the Terrorism Threat to Canada.

“An illustrative example is the backlash against Canada's 2018 Public Report on the Terrorism Threat to Canada, which listed 'Sikh extremism' (Khalistan) as one of the country's top five terrorism threats,” the ACFROC report asserts.

It continues:

“Sikh leaders publicly pressured Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, stating that: 'If the report is not revised, the Liberal Party will receive neither donations nor votes from the Sikh community. Additionally, Trudeau was barred from participating in Vancouver’s Diwali festival to canvass for votes.' Under intense pressure, the report rephrased 'Sikh extremism' to 'extremism that supports the establishment of an independent state in India through violent means.'"

Fundraising is also key, the ACFROC report says.

“In the last two general elections, why did the number of Indian political elites nominated far exceed that of Chinese? First, Indian political elites have a higher fundraising ability than Chinese. Political campaigns are a pay-to-win game. The Canadian electoral system requires each candidate to submit a certain number of party member signatures to be nominated.”

The ACFROC report tellingly uses the United Front’s language of "magic weapon" to describe the importance of diaspora voting blocks in politics: “Ethnic mobilization is the 'magic weapon' for Chinese Canadian leaders. It has a cohesive function, which is why Chinese leaders often invoke expressions of Chinese cultural identity to inspire enthusiasm for political participation.”

However, the report acknowledges monolithic mobilization can be a double-edged sword, potentially limiting Chinese candidates’ appeal to mainstream Canadian voters.

This risk was evident in one of the most controversial examples cited in the report: the case of a Liberal candidate in Burnaby who posted on WeChat during her 2019 by-election campaign, urging voters to support her over New Democratic Party leader Jagmeet Singh because of her race. She declared herself “the only Chinese candidate” and asked Chinese voters to vote along racial lines, promising to “defeat her Indian opponent.” The incident caused an immediate backlash, and the Liberal Party revoked her candidacy.

On the other hand, ACFROC’s report highlights a stark example of missed electoral opportunities due to a lack of racial unity in an Ontario riding. A candidate, referred to as “Mr. Fang,” recounted how internal divisions among the Chinese community undermined their electoral potential: “In a city with a large Chinese population, there were three seats available and six candidates running—three of them Chinese and three white. Before the election, some Chinese community leaders tried to coordinate efforts, urging two of the Chinese candidates to step down, but none agreed. As a result, all three seats were won by white candidates.”

The ACFROC report lays out a roadmap for how Chinese Canadians can emulate the political successes of the Sikh community. The recommendations include strengthening community unity, reducing internal divisions, and building robust ethnic associations capable of mobilizing voters, coordinating campaigns, and lobbying effectively. Crafting campaign messages that align with Canadian values of diversity and inclusion while subtly advancing PRC-aligned narratives is also suggested.

While the report ostensibly seeks to enhance Chinese Canadian representation, its ultimate objective aligns with Beijing’s broader geopolitical ambitions, leveraging political influence in Canada to advance PRC goals. According to The Bureau’s analysis, it underscores how Canada’s growing ethnic diversity serves as both a cornerstone of its multicultural democracy and a vulnerability increasingly exploited by foreign states.

And in retrospect, the October 2021 ACFROC report offers a calculated examination of these dynamics, even appearing to foreshadow heightened interference during the Conservative Party’s 2022 leadership race, with China, India, and Khalistan community leaders all potentially vying to back candidates capable of shaping Canada’s next government.