BC Premier Eby Sought Federal Assistance in Vetting Candidates for Organized Crime and Foreign State Links

Hogue Commission document links Eby's concerns with election interference, corruption, organized crime, money laundering and fentanyl trafficking

In an extraordinary confidential meeting with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's National Security Advisor prior to British Columbia's October 2024 election, Premier David Eby sought federal assistance in vetting provincial election candidates for “covert ties to foreign states or significant organized crime links.”

A document from the Hogue Commission, sanitized for public release, outlines the “context and drivers” behind Eby's concerns, including “foreign interference; election security; countering fentanyl, organized crime, money laundering, corruption.”

“Premier Eby asked if there was a mechanism for BC political parties to 'check' names with federal national security authorities for covert ties to foreign states or significant organized crime links,” it says.

While the document does not specify exactly why Premier Eby reached out to Trudeau’s top security advisor, it hints at deeper apprehensions. Eby wanted to understand how he would be notified if any of his nominees or candidates had undue contact with foreign states, how he would be informed if a foreign state were interfering in provincial elections, and how he should inform opposition leaders if foreign interference occurred during an election.

The Hogue Commission—mandated to examine China’s interference in recent federal elections—has not indicated that any other Canadian provincial leader engaged in discussions with Trudeau’s administration regarding election interference concerns.

However, previous media reports, citing freedom of information disclosures, reveal that in March 2023, Premier Eby met with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) following a Globe and Mail report alleging that China had meddled in Vancouver’s 2022 mayoral election.

In response to Eby's meeting with Jody Thomas, then the National Security Advisor, the Privy Council Office (PCO) outlined the limitations and potential avenues for collaboration between federal and provincial authorities.

According to the PCO's response, federal security and intelligence agencies conduct security screenings for federal employees requiring clearances, ministers, and their staff. These screenings involve strict privacy provisions and are only conducted with the individual's knowledge or consent.

While the PCO could sponsor security clearances for British Columbia provincial officials with a demonstrable need-to-know, they clarified that federal agencies do not conduct political party "checks" as part of their legislated mandates.

“Additionally, there is currently no clear avenue to directly provide classified information back to provincial parties by federal security and intelligence organizations,” the Hogue Commission document states.

However, the PCO suggested that British Columbia could consider establishing its own election security architecture composed of security-cleared personnel.

“This entity may be able to share adverse information on organized crime links with the police of jurisdiction,” the PCO advised, “which could then be relayed back to party officials, provided that appropriate information security safeguards are in place.”

Regarding Eby's question to Trudeau's security advisor about whether he would be notified if any of his nominees or candidates had undue contact with foreign states, the PCO responded that it was uncertain whether Eby had the authority to request such information, highlighting civil rights issues.

“Canadian political party candidates and nominees are accorded the same rights as all Canadians—including freedom of assembly and rights against unreasonable search and seizure,” the document says. “That said, in the context of fulfilling their mandates, it is possible that federal security and intelligence agencies uncover information regarding foreign-influenced activities and provincial politicians.”

Addressing concerns about fentanyl and organized crime—heightened by President-Elect Trump’s recent criticism of Canada’s fentanyl vulnerability—Premier Eby inquired about bolstering provincial security, with a focus on the Port of Vancouver.

The PCO recommended continued engagement with the federal government on initiatives like the establishment of a new Canada Financial Crimes Agency to bolster the nation's ability to respond swiftly to complex financial crimes.

Additionally, the PCO highlighted that Canada, the United States, and Mexico are collaborating on strategies to reduce the supply of fentanyl. This includes addressing precursor chemicals and preventing the exploitation of commercial shipping channels—a critical area where British Columbia, and specifically the Port of Vancouver, plays a significant role.

As for the 2023 meeting between CSIS and Premier Eby, as reported by Global News, Eby's handwritten notes reveal his concerns about the lack of intelligence sharing. One of the top “challenges,” he noted, was that federal agencies “may get info” about British Columbia elections without provincial authorities being informed.

Another pressing issue was money service businesses, which are central to Chinese transnational money laundering networks using Canada to launder fentanyl proceeds from the United States and internationally for Mexican cartels.

This is according to The Bureau's reporting, which relies on law enforcement experts like David Asher, a former Trump administration official and DEA consultant. “Everyone knew [about compromised currency exchanges] except us," Eby's handwritten notes from the CSIS meeting stated. "How do we identify that info so we can act on it?”