A Call for Vigilance: Loyalty to Canada or Beijing?
Columnist Gabriel Yiu of Chinese Canadian Concern Group, intervener in the Hogue Commission, warns that involvement in United Front Groups could involve prosecution, if Canada upholds new laws
By Gabriel Yiu
Over the past two years, China’s interference in Canada has dominated national headlines, fueled by groundbreaking reports from Global News and The Globe and Mail. Journalist Sam Cooper’s revelations, based on classified intelligence, shocked the nation, prompting political upheaval and forcing Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to act.
In response to mounting public and political pressure, Trudeau’s government appointed former Governor General David Johnston (who later resigned) to investigate, then launched a public inquiry led by Judge Marie-Josée Hogue, and passed Bill C-70 to strengthen national security laws and create a foreign influence registry.
After months of public hearings conducted in two phases, Commissioner Hogue is expected to submit her report to the government by the end of January.
One of the key declassified intelligence documents, submitted by Canada’s intelligence agency to the Public Safety Minister in 2023, describes China’s interference as follows:
“The People’s Republic of China presents—by far—the most significant foreign interference threat to the security of Canada, due to the scope of its activities and the level of resources it expends. The PRC singles out and targets Canadian political figures and Chinese-Canadian MPs in particular as they are seen to have influence with Chinese communities in Canada. For the PRC, FI is undertaken as United Front Work, through which the Chinese Communist Party seeks to coopt, reorient, or silence non-party elites (e.g., those with perceived influence), both within and outside China, to adopt or otherwise support Party narratives and policies, or at the least to not actively oppose them. For instance, the PRC seeks to make an example of MPs whose positions do not align with those of the PRC, to deter them from speaking out but also to intimidate and demonstrate the PRC’s reach within those communities as well.”
This intelligence is crucial for understanding China’s hidden influence on Canadian democracy.
Few Canadian MPs openly criticize China or its human rights abuses, particularly regarding Hong Kong. In 2021, Parliament unanimously passed a motion condemning China’s severe human rights abuses against Uyghurs in Xinjiang. However, among the five Chinese-Canadian MPs from Ontario, only MP Michael Chong, who introduced the motion, voted in favor. The other four abstained. In British Columbia, three Chinese-Canadian MPs voted in support of the motion, two of whom later lost their seats in the next election.
Media reports revealed intelligence suggesting that Vancouver’s Chinese Consul General celebrated her strategy’s success in unseating two Conservative MPs in the 2021 election.
A 2021 classified document by Canada’s intelligence agency titled “The PRC’s Foreign Interference in Canada: A Serious National Security Threat” (declassified during public inquiry hearings) included the following key assessment:
“United front work spans overt, clandestine, and deceptive tactics orchestrated by PRC officials and diplomats. This work, which is guided by the UFWD, often takes place in a legal and normative ‘grey zone,’ antithetical to liberal-democratic governance and the rule of law.”
Again, this intelligence, reinforced by that of Canada’s Five Eyes allies, explains the insidious impact of CCP political subversion in our democratic systems.
The U.S. Department of State’s 2018 report, “China’s Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States,” elaborated:
“China uses what it calls ‘United Front’ work to co-opt and neutralize sources of potential opposition to the policies and authority of its ruling Chinese Communist Party. The CCP’s United Front Work Department—the agency responsible for coordinating these kinds of influence operations—mostly focuses on the management of potential opposition groups inside China, but it also has an important foreign influence mission. To carry out its influence activities abroad, the UFWD directs ‘overseas Chinese work,’ which seeks to co-opt ethnic Chinese individuals and communities living outside China, while a number of other key affiliated organizations guided by China’s broader United Front strategy conduct influence operations targeting foreign actors and states.”
This is not a small or disorganized operation.
According to a report by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, MP Michael Chong highlighted that Beijing’s UFWD receives an annual budget of $2.6 billion, with approximately $600 million allocated for activities in Western countries. Chong estimated that about 10% of the UFWD’s external funding—roughly $60 million—is directed at Canada. Given that the “Greater Chinese” diaspora accounts for only about 5% of Canada’s population, Chong suggested this demonstrates Beijing’s intensive interference efforts here.
The impact of years of these operations is wide-ranging.
China’s United Front efforts in Canada have been highly successful. Chinese-language media, community leaders, and some politicians actively “tell China’s story well,” promoting narratives such as: there are no human rights abuses in Xinjiang, the National Security Law has brought prosperity to Hong Kong, China has its own form of democracy, Chinese citizens enjoy freedom and human rights, China has not interfered in Canadian elections, and Canada is targeting China at the behest of the U.S.
In such a controlled information environment, many Chinese Canadians who rely solely on Chinese-language media may fail to recognize these issues or may believe that English-language media is exaggerating or slandering China. This reinforces the belief that there is no national security threat.
Some individuals, aware of the situation, still defend and speak for China due to personal interests. Others target politicians and individuals who dare to criticize the CCP. Some community groups, fearing repercussions or acting under instructions from the Chinese consulate, have refused to invite certain MPs to community events.
While these actions may seem minor, they carry significant implications. These groups, aligning with the CCP, actively assist Beijing in targeting Canadian politicians.
In the past, hundreds of Chinese community groups and individuals have published joint advertisements in Chinese newspapers supporting the Chinese government. These groups include hometown and clan associations, business chambers, alumni associations, sports and cultural organizations, and even veterans’ groups.
This bears repeating: hundreds of groups in Canada are overtly acting for China’s government.
Such advertisements, often full-page and appearing on the front page, may celebrate National Day in both China and Canada, which might seem unproblematic. However, many of these groups have also published advertisements supporting controversial Chinese policies condemned by Canada and the UN, such as the National Security Law in Hong Kong, denying the genocide of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and criticizing Canadian Parliament and MPs.
Why have hometown and clan associations, as well as cultural and sports groups, become so politicized—taking positions unrelated to their founding missions and even contrary to their constitutions (e.g., being nonpartisan and apolitical)?
A friend from a community group explained that they participated in response to the call of a larger organization. Whether the leadership of that organization received directives from the Chinese consulate or financial support remains unclear.
Community groups and their leaders pledge loyalty to the CCP, but their actions betray their loyalty to Canada and its values. If directed by the Chinese consulate, they may even violate Canadian law. Under Bill C-70, assisting foreign interference without disclosure is now a crime punishable by fines of up to $5 million and imprisonment for up to five years.
So why do some individuals in Chinese communities choose to pledge loyalty to China over Canada? Motivations range from business interests to personal vanity. Leaders of major community organizations and owners of Chinese-language media outlets have received prestigious invitations to events in China, including National Day military parades at Tiananmen Square, and some were even appointed as overseas members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).
Since 2000, the U.S. has publicly disclosed over 200 cases involving espionage and interference linked to the CCP. In Canada, however, no one has been prosecuted despite mounting evidence of interference. Now that Bill C-70 has passed and a foreign influence registry is underway, community members must recognize these red lines to avoid severe legal consequences.
It's high time that people in the West, in particular Canadians, understand that we are at war with the CCP. Pretending that wars only involve planes, bombs and fatigue wearing troops, is the height of naivete. The Hybrid War that the CCP had been engaging in for decades is designed specifically to weaken every part of Western society. Drugs, crime, social discord, economic pressure, undermining trust in our political systems - they are all weapons. Look where it had bright Canada today. No functional government, Parliament paralyzed, our neighbor and (historically) strongest ally and friend considering annexing this country for is own security and economic purposes. If we do elect a new government it should well consider the use of the Not Withstanding Clause to force through the legislation that could repair our vulnerabilities. 8 years may be long enough to clean house. Maybe.
Bravo! Now what we need is a .canadian Government that will ensure that charges are actually laid under this law, when warranted.